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I. Introduction 
The question of how a monopolist owner of a .bottleneck facility 
should set the price for access to the facility by an entrant or rival 
supplier of a complementary component continues to be an inter- 
esting question for theory and policy.1 This question is often 
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framed in terms of a regulated monopolist vis-a-vis an entrant or 
rival in an unregulated complementary activity; but the issue can 
also arise in the antitrust context of an unregulated "essential 
facility" monopolist that is vertically integrated into a comple- 
mentary upstream or downstream activity in which one or more 
other producers are present (or may enter)? 
As technological changes and legal-regulatory changes have 
created more opportunities for competition in activities that are 
complementary to a still-regulated bottleneck facility, ' the policy 
relevance of the access pricing question has been heightened. 
Familiar examples include: 
Local telephone service entrants ,who must route calls to and from 
the customers of the incumbent (bottleneck monopoly) provider 
through the incumbent's switches. 
Long-distance telephone service providers who must access cus- 
tomers via the local (monopoly) switched network; this example 
extends immediately to other providers of complementary telephone 
services. In these instances, the local monopolist is u s d y  also an 
actual or potential provider of the long-distance and other comple- 
mentary services. 
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Generators of electricity who wish to sell to ultimate customer-users 
but who can reach those customers only through a local (monopoly) 
distribution network (and possibly also a monopoly transmission sys- 
tem); again the local monopoly distributor typically also owns gener- 
ating facilities. 
Sellers of natural gas who similarly wish to sell to ultimate customer- 
users but who can reach those customers only through monopoly gas 
transmission pipelines andfor a monopoly local distribution network. 
In addition, eased merger standards in some sectors (e.g., rail- 
roads) have created local monopoly bottlenecks that generate an 
access problem for competing firms that provide complementary 
components or services. 
A widely discussed "rule" for the pricing of access to these 
bottleneck facilities was originally proposed by Baumol' and has 
recently been popularized by Baumol and S ida l~ ;~  it is frequently 
described as the "efficient component pricing rule" (ECPR), 
which is the terminology that we will use in our subsequent dis- 
cussion. The ECPR states that the appropriate access charge by 
the bottleneck monopolist to the providers (actual or potential) of 
a complementary component or service, which the monopolist 
also produces (and thus the other providers are rivals to the 
monopolist), is a fee equal to monopolist's opportunity costs of 
providing the access, including any foregone revenues from a 
concomitant reduction in the monopolist's sales of the comple- 
mentary component. 
The ECPR has a seductive logic: It insures that a rival producer 
of the complementary component can provide service only if that 
producer is at least as efficient as the monopolist in the production 
of the complementary component; i.e., the ECPR insures that pro- 
duction will not be diverted to an inefficient producer. 
It is now well established that the ECPR holds as a first-best 
pricing principle only if a stringent set of assumptions holds9 the 
3 See Baumol, supra note 1. 
See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, and BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra 
note 1. 
5 See Laffont & Tirole, supra note 1. 
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monopolist's price for the complementary service has been based 
on a marginal-cost pricing mle; the monopolist's and rival pro- 
ducer's components are perfect substitutes; the production tech- 
nology of the component experiences constant returns to scale; the 
rival producer has no market power; and the monopolist's 
marginal cost of production of the component can be accurately 
observed. 
In this article, we will examine the consequences of relaxing 
some of these assumptions. We focus special attention on the case 
where the monopolist has been charging a price for the comple- 
mentary component that is above all relevant marginal costs. As 
we show, in this case the ECPR's exclusion of inefficient rivals 
may be socially harmful; the market presence of even an ineffi- 
cient rival could bring net social benefits, by causing the price to 
fall sufficiently so that the net gain to consumers (the reduction in 
the deadweight loss "triangle") would exceed the inefficiency 
costs of the rival's production. 
To help readers with the analysis that follows, we offer figure 
1 as a schematic of the framework that we are presenting. We 
describe our framework in terms of telephone services (but the 
other examples mentioned above are easily applied): The monop- 
olist owns the switch at location B and provides local telephone 
service between and among customers at points A1, A2, Ag, etc. 
All of the local customers must use the monopolist's switch to 
complete (connect) their local calls and to gain access to other 
(complementary) services, such as long distance. 
The same firm that provides the monopoly local service also 
provides service from points A1, A2, Ag, etc., through switch B to 
point C. This service could be "long distance"; or it could be 
additional "local" service to additional customers; or it could be 
some other complementary service (e.g., access to an information 
database) that requires the use of switch B. We will describe this 
ABC (or CBA6) service simply as "through service." There is at 
-- 
a For a discussion of one-way networks and two-way networks, see 
Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White, Networks and Compatibility: 
Implications for Antitrust, 38 EURO. ECON. REV. 651 (1994). In two-way 
networks, such as telephone or rail systems, ABC and CBA are distinct 
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Figure 1 
~nterconnection to a Bottleneck. (The links owned by the monopolist are 
drawn in bold) 
Complementmy Component 
least one other potential or actual provider of the service to point 
' C. This rival requires access to (through) the switch in order to 
provide the A1, A2, A3, etc., customers with the "through" service 
ABC (and CBA). We assume, however, that the rival owns only 
facilities between BC, while the monopolist owns the switch B as 
well as'its own facilities between BC (drawn in bold) and the 
links AIB, A2B, etc. In the language of the ECPR, the switch B is 
the monopoly bottleneck7 and segment BC is the complementary 
component. 
The early sections of the article will assume the following: 
The monopolist and the rival offer identical service over segment 
BC. 
Service between B and C has value only as part of the through ser- 
vice ABC or CBA. 
Constant returns to scale production technology applies to the pro- 
duction of service between B and C.8 
goods or services. In a one-way network (such as an electricity grid), 
only one of these combinations is meaningful. - 
7 The segments between B and Al, Az, Ag, etc., may or may not 
also be part of the monopoly bottleneck. 
8 We will make the standard economics assumption that normal, 
competitive profit levels will be a component of the cost concepts dis- 
cussed later in the article. 
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The monopolist is able to charge prices for Iocal service to its local 
customers that are sufficient to cover all of its costs of providing that 
local service (i-e., sufficient to cover the costs of providing links AB 
and the costs of the switch). 
The price of the through service ABC (and CBA) is not subject to 
direct price regulation. 
The consumer demands for local service and through service exhibit 
normal properties; e.g., the prices that consumers %e willing to pay 
are indicative of the welfare or satisfaction that they receive from the 
services; at lower prices consumers want to buy more of the services, 
etc. 
In later sections of the article we will explore the conse- 
quences of modifying some of these assumptions. 
The remainder of this article will proceed as follows: section 
I1 will lay out the structure of the basic ECPR and explore its 
logic. Section II will examine the consequences of the monopo- 
list's price embodying a monopoly overcharge. Section IV will 
analyze the consequences of the components' not being perfect 
substitutes. Section V discusses the case when economies of scale 
are present. And section VI will offer a brief conclusion. 
11. The logic of the efficient component pricing rule 
The logic of the ECPR is readily demonstrated through a sim- 
ple numerical example: 
Suppose that the monopolist charges a price of $0.10 for 
through service ABC (or CBA). Suppose further that the monopo- 
list's marginal costs of providing this service are $0.02 for seg- 
ment BC and $0.05 for segment AB (including the relevant 
marginal costs of the switch B). The ECPR simply states that the 
appropriate price or fee for the monopolist to charge to the rival 
for access to switch B (and for providing the connecting service 
AB) is $0.08: The $0.05 of marginal costs relevant to segment 
AB plus the foregone net revenue of $0.03 that the monopolist 
loses when the rival provides the through service in lieu of the 
monopolist. 
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If the rival is being charged a fee of $0.08 for access, and the 
monopolist is charging $0.10 as its price to customers for through 
service, then the rival will be able to offer through service without 
incuning losses only if its marginal costs for segment BC are at or 
below $0.02-i-e., at or below the marginal costs (over BC) of the 
monopolist. 
Thus, the ECPR insures that the rival enters and produces in 
the market only if its costs are no greater than those of the monop- 
olist; inefficient diversion of production away from the monopo- 
list will not occur as a consequence of the presence of the rival in 
the market. Further, if al l  of the conditions mentioned in the Intro- 
duction (including pricing by the monopolist at marginal cost) are 
satisfied, the ECPR will provide global efficiency. 
III. The monopolist initially has market power in the 
complementary component 
The previous section made no explicit assumption as to the 
basis for the monopolist's price for the through service. We now 
explicitly assume that in the absence of the rival the monopolist is 
able to charge the full profit-maximizing monopoly price for the 
through service.9 In turn, this maximizing behavior implies that the 
monopolist's markup over marginal costs is directly related to those 
rnarbcJinal costs and to the elasticity of demand for the service. 
This monopoly outcome can be portrayed in a familiar geo- 
metric diagram, provided in figure 2. With demand curve OD) for 
through service and constant marginal costs (MC) for the monopo- 
BaumoI & Sidak, supra note 1, and BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 
1, briefly acknowledge the possibility that the monopolist's price for the 
complementary component (or, in our case, through service) might reflect 
market power and not be based on a marginal-cost pricing rule, and they 
acknowledge that this possibility would mean that the optimal properties 
of the ECPR would not hold; but they nevertheless devote virtually all of 
their analysis and discussion to the case where market power is absent. 
Kahn & Taylor, supra note 1, note this brief acknowledgement and the 
possibilities that might follow from market power, but they do not fully 
pursue the point. 
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list, the profit-maximizing monopolist would charge a price of PM 
and produce a quantity QM. (This can be compared to the price PC 
and quantity Qc that would be yielded by a marginal-cost pricing 
regime.) The monopolist's markup over marginal costs is the ver- 
tical distance between PM and MC. 
Figure 2 
Monopoly Pricing and Deadweight Loss 
The ECPR described in the previous section would prescribe 
that the monopolist's markup or overcharge be a component of the 
access fee. Thus, the ECPR would deter inefficient rivals (those 
with marginal costs that are higher than the monopolist's MC) and 
prevent inefficient production. But the ECPR also protects the 
monopolist porn any competitive challenge by these rivals and 
thus protects the monopolist's profits; and the ECPR preserves the 
allocative or consumption inefficiency that results from the 
monopolist's excessively high price for through service. The 
social loss of the protected monopoly is usually calculated as the 
"deadweight loss triangle" (DWL) shown as the shaded area in 
figure 2: The loss of consumers' surplus by demanders who are 
shut out of the market by the monopolist's high price. 
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It is easy to see that, if the monopolist has market power in the 
market for the complementary component, the ECPR is the 
monopolist's profit-maximizing access fee when the rival is less 
efficient than the monopolist, since the ECPR precludes entry and 
allows the monopolist to continue to reap its full monopoly 
rents.1° 
A. Production by a less efficient rival could yield . 
net social gains 
If the monopolist were required (e.g., by regulation) to levy a 
lower access fee, a less efficient rival could begin production. But 
it is nevertheless possible that social welfare would increase, 
because the diminished DWL from the lower price that could 
accompany entry could more than compensate for the social cost 
of the rival's inefficient produckon.ll The magnitudes of the price 
decrease and the rival's inefficiency, and also the fractions of post- 
entry production that the rival captures, will be crucial to this 
determination. 
1. BERTRAND COMPETITION TO show that entry by even an inef- 
ficient rival could yield socially beneficial results, we assume that 
the monopolist is restricted (e.g., by regulation) to levying an 
access fee that is equal only to the actual marginal costs of access 
(i.e., the marginal costs of segment AB, including the switch). We 
further assume that an entrant to segment BC has higher costs 
than the monopolist by an amount t, where 0 < t I PM - MC). 
Suppose that in response to the prospect or actuality of entry, 
the monopolist practices limit pricing: It sets the price (PJ) at 
which both producers sell at a level that is just equal to the 
entrant's costs. Under this pricing regime the entrant will capture 
some share 8 (0 5 8 I 1.0) of the joint market sales (QJ) of 
through service. 
10 Tht profit-maximizing access fee when the rival is more efficient 
than the monopolist is discussed below in the text 
11 The analysis that follows in the text is an adaptation, in reverse 
form, of the approach of Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as  an 
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
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In the terms of figure 3, consider the change from pure 
monopoly (point X) to limit pricing (at point Y). The approximate 
social gain from this change is a combination of a "triangle" gain 
in consumers' surplus ('12 AP AQ = ll2P~ -PJ]'[QJ - QM]), rep- 
resented by area XYZ, and a "rectangle" gain in producers' sur- 
plus (t*AQ = t*[Qj - QM]), represented by .area ZYRW; the 
combined areas are the trapezoid XYRW. This gain is offset by 
the productibn inefficiency: the entrant's cost disadvantage multi- 
plied by the entrant's production volume, or to%, which repre- 
sents some fraction (8) of the rectangle PjYRPc. The net gain can 
be either positive or negative, depending on the values oft, 8, and 
the elasticity of demand (e). 
Figure 3 






For specified values of 8 and e, it is possible to find (solve 
for) a maximum level of cost disadvantage (t*) that just eliminates 
the net social gain.'= Then, for the specified values of 8 and e, 
entry by a firm with cost disadvantage t, t < t*, will yield a social 
gain. In table 1 we provide the t* values associated with a range of 
l2 Appendix A provides the calculations that yield t*. 
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plausible values for e and for some benchmark values of 0: 8 = 0 
(the mere threat of entry causes the monopolist to practice limit 
pricing); 0 = 0.5 (a Bertrand equal-sharing of the market between 
the monopolist and the rival); and 8 = 1.0 (the "worst" case, in 
which the less efficient rival somehow captures the entire market). 
As can be seen, for these "realistic" elasticity values, a rival may 
experience a substantial cost disadvantage and still be the vehicle 
for a net social welfare improvement. These results are even more 
striking if the rival's cost disadvantage is expressed as a percent- 
age of the monopoly's profit-maximizing price differential (or 
profit margin). 
Table I 
Matrix oft* Values for Bemand Competition 
Profit maximizing monopoly markup over marginal cost (profit margin). 
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses represent t' expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum monopoly markup. 
2. COURNOT DUOPOLY We have thus far performed our analysis 
on the basis of an assumption of a "tough" pricing environment 
between the monopolist and the rival: Bertrand-like limit pricing 
by the monopolist. More accommodating behavior between the 
monopolist and the rival would yield higher prices for any t by the 
rival and hence a lesser likelihood of a social welfare gain; at the 
limit, if both the monopolist and rival sell at the monopoly price 
(PM), with the monopolist ceding to the entrant some share 8 of 
the monopoly volume (QM), then the outcome yields only the 
social loss ( t e Q ~ )  due to the inefficient production of the entrant. 
As an example of an intermediate level of pricing toughness, 
we assume that the competition between the incumbent and the 
entrant is a-la-Cournot; i.e., each producer adjusts its own produc- 
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tion quantity on the assumption that the other producer's quantity 
will remain unchanged. If a linear demand curve is used for illus- 
tration, then, similar to our Bertrand demonstration, we can solve 
for a t*, such that all t < t* will yield a net social gain." For this 
Cournot conjecture by the producers, the market share of the 
entrant (8) is endogenous, with 8 = 0.31 (i-e., a market share of 
31 %) at t = t* and 8 = 0.50 at t = 0. Table 2 shows the critical val- 
ues of t* for the same "realistic" values of e that were provided in 
our Bertrand case. As can be seen in a comparison of table 2 with 
table 1, the t* values for this Cournot case are smaller than for the 
Bertrand case, because Cournot competition implies higher prices 
and a substantial market share for the Iess efficient rival. Still, 
again, entry by a f nn with a nontrivial production cost disadvan- 
tage relative to the monopolist can result in a net social gain. 
- - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - -  
Table 2 
Values of t* for Cournot Competition 
NOTE: The numbers in parentheses represent t* expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum monopoly markup. 
We also note that if more than one rival is present in the mar- 
ket, so that there is competition among a number of firms, the 
equilibrium price is likely to be closer to the Bertrand limit pric- 
ing case, and definitely lower than for the Cournot duopoly. Thus, 
in the presence of more than one rival, the welfare gain from the 
competition that they bring is more likely to be positive. 
3. A SUMMING UP The ECPR's apparent strenfl-its exclusion 
of an inefficient rival-may also be its drawback when the 
monopolist is charging high prices (in excess of all relevant 
marginal costs) for the complementary component. In that case, 
the exclusion of the rival also prevents the possibility of a lower 
price for the complementary component, with its attendant reduc- 
- - - 
13 Appendix B shows the steps that are required to solve the Cournot 
competition problem and generate a solution for to. 
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tion in consumers' deadweight loss; the net social gain from the 
rival's presence could be positive. The extent of the price 
decrease, the size of the rival's cost advantage, and the rival's 
equilibrium market share are the key determinants of whether the 
rival's presence in the market would be beneficial. In turn, the 
oligopolistic conjecture held by the two producers and the market 
elasticity of demand will influence these magnitudes. At one 
extreme, if the monopolist practices Bertrand-like limit pricing, 
the presence of a rival with even a substantial cost disadvantage 
can be socially beneficial. At the other extreme, if the monopolist 
and the rival jointly maintain the monopolist's previous high price 
(with the monopolist simply ceding some market share to the 
rival), then any market presence by a less efficient rival will be 
socially deleterious. Cournot duopoly yields an equilibrium price 
that is between these extremes, with an endogenously determined 
market share for the rival. Even with Cournot duopoly, nontrivial 
cost inefficiencies by the rival are consistent with a net social 
gain. 
Further reflection on the ECPR reveals both a greater univer- 
sality to its logic but also a greater universality to the critique that 
we have- just offered.14 Though the ECPR is usually presented in 
terms of access to a bottleneck facility, its logic extends to any 
entry by any rival firm into anymarket where there is an incum- 
bent. If the sole goal of social policy is to prevent inefficient pro- 
duction by an entrant from displacing more efficient production 
by the incumbent, then the ECPR principle-the entrant must 
reimburse incumbent for the latter's opportunity costs, including 
foregone net revenues-will achieve that goal. But, i f  the incum- 
bent is exercising market power; then the use of the ECPR will 
also protect the incumbent and preserve its market power against 
the competitive erosion of prices and margins that even less effi- 
cient rivals could bring. If the ECPR is placed in this context, the 
luster of its rationale tarnishes rapidly. 
An "entry tax" that required market entrants generally to reim- 
burse incumbents for their foregone net revenues would quickly 
14 We are grateful to Timothy Brennan for pointing this out to us. 
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be seen as a protective and anticompetitive device and would 
likely receive little support from policy-oriented economists, 
despite any claims that the tax would preclude inefficient produc- 
tion. The ECPR is just this type of entry tax. 
B. The ECPR's harm when the rival is more eflcient 
than the monopolist 
The previous section only addressed instances where the rival 
is less efficient than the monopolist in the production of the com- 
plementary component. Even in those circumstances, as we 
demonstrated, the net effect of the ECPR could be harmful. 
If the rival is more efficient than the monopolist, then the 
monopolist's profit-maximizing strategy would generally's be to 
cede production of $e complementary component to the more 
efficient rival and to reap its monopoly profits through an appro- 
priate access fee.16 This access fee could be either greater or less 
than the ECPR, depending on the shape of the demand curve for 
through service. 
Thus, for this case the presence of the ECPR would allow pro- 
duction'to shift to the more efficient producer. But the ECPR 
access fee would mean that consumers would continue to endure 
the inefficiencies of the artificially high price for through service. 
And the divergence of the ECPR from the monopolist's profit- 
maximizing access fee could imply either further distortion (if the 
ECPR is higher than the profit-maximizing fee) or a lessening of 
distortion (if the ECPR is lower)." 
15 We discuss exceptions below in the text. 
l6 By ceding all production of the complementary component to the 
rival, the monopolist might be creating problems of vertical supplier-cus- 
tomer relationships, with the consequent problems of double marginaliza- 
tion, etc. But the monopolist's ability to sex-supply the complementary 
component at its own marginal cost would put a limit on the extent to 
which the rival could attempt to expIoit that position. 
l7 The discussion in this section thus indicates that a more complete 
"Williamson" type analysis should also include the possibility that a 
more efficient rival might enter, and the absence of the ECPR would 
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IV. The complementary components of the monopolist and 
the rival are imperfect substitutes 
We now assume that the complementary components of the 
monopolist and the rival are imperfect substitutes; i.e., the 
monopolist and the rival compete in offering through service, but 
their service offerings are not identical. To continue with our tele- 
phone example, the rival's through service (e-g., long-distance 
service) might involve faster connections or a higher percentage 
of completed calls, but also an increased level of static on the 
line, as compared with the monopolist's long-distance service. 
The introduction of imperfect substitutes immediately calls 
into question the meaning of any comparisons of production cost 
efficiency between the two components. Since the two components 
now have different attributes &d satisfy (somewhat) different 
demands, comparisons of their unit costs have little or no meaning. 
It is rarely interesting or analytically worthwhile to compare the 
"unit" costs of an apple producer and an orange producer. 
Even if the units of the two complementary components are 
somehow comparable, the analog of the ECPR's consequences for 
the perfect substitutes case is that the imposition of the ECPR to 
the rival's imperfect substitute would exclude a rival's production 
entirely when there was no customer with a willingness to pay for 
the rival's service such that the rival's price-less-costs margin 
could exceed the ECPR access fee. Unless the ECPR were based 
on a marginal-cost pricing rule (and thus in this case there were 
no customers of the rival's service whose willingness to pay 
would cover all relevant marginal costs), the exclusion of these 
"modest" willingness-to-pay customers by the ECPR access fee 
would not serve the goal of promoting production efficiency.l* 
If we move away from a production efficiency criterion, then 
an access fee might serve some other purpose-say, maximize the 
mean that consumers would enjoy the full benefits of the lower price 
brought by the entrant. 
18 See also Laffont & Tirole, supra note 1; h s t r o n g  & Doyle, 
supra note 1 ;  and Armstrong & Vickers, supra note 1. 
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monopolist's profits, or help solve a Ramsey pricing problem if 
inadequate revenues can be earned from the monopolist's bottle- 
neck service customers. Only by chance would the ECPR access 
fee be the solution to either of these problems. 
Economies of scale 
In the presence of economies of scale in the production of the 
bottleneck service andlor the complementary component, the 
ECPR is again unlikely to provide a f~st-best pricing outcome. 
A. Ramsey pricing 
Suppose, contrary to our earlier assumption, that the monopo- 
list is unable to earn sufficient revenue in the bottleneck market to 
cover its costs (e.g., because of economies of scale). In the 
absence of any other source of funds, the regulator must extract a 
contribution from the customers of through service. To maximize 
social welfare, the regulator must solve a Ramsey problem: select 
the set of prices for local service and through service that maxi- 
mizes consumers' surplus while also covering the costs of those 
services: The resulting Ramsey price for through service would 
involve, in essence, an excise tax that is levied on through ser- 
vice. If the monopolist is the low cost producer of the comple- 
mentary component, the monopolist "pays the excise tax. to 
itself'; if the rival is the low cost producer, the rival pays the tax 
to the monopolist as an access fee. To insure optimality, the regu- 
lator would have to regulate directly the excise tax and the result- 
ing price of through service. Only by chance would the ECPR 
access fee be identical to the Ramsey excise tax.19 
B. The monopolist may use the ECPR to exclude a more 
efficient rival 
There are at least two circumstances in which the monopolist's 
profit-maximizing strategy is to exclude the rival, even when the 
l9 See LafYont & Tirole, supra note 1; Armstrong & Doyle, supra 
note 1; and Armstrong & Vickers, supra note 1. 
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rival is more efficient at producing the complementary compo- 
nent, rather than cede production to the rival. In both instances, 
the monopolist would find it worthwhile to understate its own 
marginal costs of production of the complementary component 
and then impose a heightened ECPR on the rival. 
In the first case, we now assume either that segment BC is a 
separate stand-alone market (as would be true for local railroad 
freight hauling) or that it  is a complementary component for 
through service to (or from) points D, E, F, etc., that are served by 
other finns (but not by the original monopolist). We also depart 
from our assumption of constant returns to scale in the production 
of the complementary component and instead assume that there 
are economies of scale. If the monopolist can exclude the (more 
efficient) rival fiom offering through service in the ABC market, 
this could sufficiently deprive the rival of the benefits of scale so 
that the (less efficient) monopolist would also be the monopolist 
of the BC segment and reap monopoly profits from the stand- 
done BC service or from the through service to the other points. 
To achieve this outcome, the monopolist could understate its 
marginal costs of production of the complementary component 
(BC service) and then employ the ECPR criterion to levy an 
exclusionary access fee vis-a-vis the rival. 
As a second case, we alter our earlier assumption about the 
monopolist's behavior in the bottleneck market. We assume that 
the monopolist is constrained by regulation to earn zero excess 
profits in the bottleneck market. If, however, the regulator cannot 
observe the monopolist's costs perfectly, then the monopolist can 
increase its aggregate profits by claiming that some of its costs of 
production of the complementary component should be treated 
(for regulatory purposes) as costs of production of the bottleneck 
services.20 To the extent that the monopolist succeeds in this "cre- 
This is a well-known possibility and was one of the major argu- 
ments for separating regulated monopoly local telephone service from 
other complementary services. See, for example, Roger G.  No11 & Bruce 
M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. 
AT&T, in THE A ~ ~ ~ R U S T  RMOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS 328 (John 
E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 1994); Timothy J. Brennan, Why 
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ative accounting" for some of the marginal costs of production of 
the complementary component, these apparently lower marginal 
costs would justify a higher ECPR access fee. This higher access 
fee will again deter some efficient rivals-i.e., those with 
marginal production cost levels that are less than the monopolist's 
true marginal costs of production of the complementary compo- 
nent but greater than the remaining marginal costs that the monop- 
olist still attributes to the production of the complementary 
comp0nent.2~ 
VI. Conclusion 
The efficient component pricing rule for access pricing has a 
seductive logic: It appears to insure that only efficient production 
of a complementary component (to a monopoly bottleneck ser- 
vice) will occur. The ECPR holds as a first-best principle, how- 
ever, only under a stringent set of assumptions. 
Only empirical observation can ascertain,whether these 
assumptions are closely enough approximated in reality that the 
ECPR is a reasonable basis for policy. Our professional judgment 
is that real-world conditions are often likely to diverge impor- 
tantly from the necessary assumptions. We are most concerned 
about the assumption that the monopolist's pricing of the comple- 
mentary component is driven by marginal cost (or R ~ e y )  prin- 
ciples. If, instead, the monopolist's price reflects the exercise of 
market power, then the ECPR will protect that market power and 
prevent consumers from benefiting from the price competition 
that a rival (entrant) could bring. We show that there are quite rea- 
sonable circumstances under which the presence of even a less 
efficient rival would bring about a positive net social welfare 
Regulated Finns Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets: Under- 
standing the Divestiture in United States v. AT&T, 32 BW. 
741 (1987); and Timothy J. Brennan, Cross-Subsidization and Cost Mis- 
allocation by Regulated Monopolists, 2 J .  REG. ECON. 37 (1990). 
21 Though this incentive for cost shifting (which is, in essence, regu- 
latory evasion) is not dependent on the presence of the ECPR the ECPR 
may well add the distorting element of the exclusion of an efficient rival. 
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change. We also explore the consequences of the loosening of 
some of the other assumptions. 
In sum, in real-world settings policy makers should be wary of 
blind devotion to the ECPR. It has dangers as well as benefits, 
and the real-world settings may well be ones in which the dangers 
outweigh the benefits. 
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APPENDIX A 
In this appendix, we show how the net social gain can be 
expressed in terms of t, 8, and e, and how t' can subsequently be 
determined. We assume that the incumbent has marginal costs of c 
and that the rival has marginal costs of c + t. 
If the incumbent can exercise market power and act as a 
monopolist, its price (PM) is 
If, in the presence of the rival, the monopolist practices limit pric- 
ing, the price (PJ) at which both firms will sell (PJ = PM = PR) is 
The consumers' surplus "triangle" gain from this switch from 
monopoly to emit pricing is 
'12 (AQ)(@) = I12 (QJ - QM) CPM - PJ) 
= ~QJ(AP)~/(~PJ) 
= eQj[c/(e - 1) - t]2/[2(c + t)]. 
The producers' surplus "rectangle" gain is 
~ * ( A Q > = ~ * ( Q J - Q M )  
= ~~(@)QJ/PJ 
= teQ[c/(e - 1) - t]/[Z(c + t)]. 
Finally, the production inefficiency loss "rectangle" is 
If the last expression is subtracted from the sum of the preced- 
ing two expressions, the net social gain that results from entry and 
limit pricing is ' 
Q[e{[c/(e - 1) - t]2 + t[c/(e - 1) - t])/[2(c + t)] - te]. 
If we normalize by setting c = 1, we find that this expression is 
positive if and only if 
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t < t *  = 
-(e + 20) 
It is this expression that is the basis for the values in tab!e 1. 
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APPENDIX B 
In this appendix, we provide the solution to the simple Cournot 
game and the subsequent determination oft*, where the incumbent 
has marD+al costs of c, the rival has marginal costs of c + t, and 
the inverse demand for the service is linear, P = a - bQ, express- 
ing the relationship between price (P) and quantity (Q). Quantity, 
in turn, is the sum of the incumbent's production (QI) and the 
rival's production (QR); the price at which they sell jointly is Pj. 
The incumbent's profits are 
n = [ a - b ( Q ~ + Q d l e Q ~ - c Q ~ .  
The rival's profits are 
The non-cooperative equilibrium of the quantity setting (Cournot) 
game is 
Given the quantities determined at the equilibrium, the market 
share of the rival is 
€I = @/Qr = [a - c - 2t]/[2(a - c) - t]. 
Since the pure monopoly equilibrium for the incumbent is 
QM = (a - c)/(Zb), PM = (a + c)/2, 
the consumers' surplus "triangle" gain from the switch from the 
monopoly to Cournot duopoly is 
1/2 (AQ)(AP) = 112 (QT - QM) (PM - Pj) = (a - c - 2t)2/(72b). 
The producers' surplus "rectangle" gain from the switch is 
(QT - QM) (PJ - C) = [a - c - 2t][a - c + t]/(18b). 
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Finally, the production inefficiency loss "rectangle" attributable to 
the rival's output is 
If the last expression is subtracted from the sum of the preced- 
ing two expressions, the net social'gain that results from entry 
under Cournot behavior is 
This expression is positive if and only if both bracketed terms are 
positive (or both are negative). The economically relevant case 
requires 
5(a- c) - 22t > 0, 
or, equivalently, . 
t < t* = 5(a - c)/22. 
The elasticity of demand at the Cournot equilibrium is 
e = (AQ/AP)/(Q/Pj) = [a + 2c + t]/[2(a - c) - t]. 
If we normalize by setting c = 1, this last expression can be solved 
for a in terms of e and t, and this result can then be used to solve 
for t* in terms of the elasticity e: 
It is this expression that provides the basis for the values in 
table 2. 
